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NORWAY’S COMPANIES ACT: A
10-YEAR LOOK AT GENDEREQUALITY
Kristen Carroll*
ABSTRACT
This analysis assesses the amendment to Norway’s Companies Act, in light of the 10-year anniversary of the mandate
of female representation on corporate boards. First, I discuss
the implementation of the quota, Section 6-11a. Second, I compare three statistical studies that analyze the effects of the
quota on corporate profitability, overall firm performance, and
the changing dynamics of the managerial positions. Finally, I
evaluate the various avenues to fully achieving diversity, such
as the successes and failures of a quota-type system and possible initiatives that governments and companies can enact to
achieve gender-balance in the workplace. While some hypothesize that the quota negatively affects overall firm capability
and value, the statistical data on the effects of the legislation is
not dispositive. Ultimately, it is in the best interest of corporations to learn from Norway’s example in implementing mandatory female representation, and to explore other avenues to
achieving diversity.

I.

BACKGROUND ON NORWAY’S COMPANIES ACT

“Power is not something that is given, it is something that
you have to take.” 1 A Danish economist, Benja Stig-Fagerland,
* Kristen Carroll received her J.D. cum laude with an International Law
Certificate from Pace Law School in 2014. Upon graduation she was a recipient of the Adolf Homburger Humanitarian Award, and served as Editor-inChief of Pace International Law Review and Co-Chair of the Moot Court
Honor Board in 2013-2014.
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said this in regards to securing female leaders in Norway during the time the quota was enacted, which mandated female
representation on Norway’s corporate boards.2 In 1999, the
quota was first recommended as an amendment to the Equal
Status Act of 1978.3 Just before the final vote on the issue,
Ansgar Gabrielsen, the Minister of Trade and Industry, expressed that he was “sick and tired of the male dominance of
business life.”4 These unequivocal viewpoints sparked the fire
needed for the quota to pass into law, and set the precedent for
gender-equality in the corporate world of Norway.
Section 6-11(a) defines the quota, which mandates both
men and women to be represented on corporate boards5 in all
public limited companies in the private sector.6 The representation breakdown is as follows:
(1)

In the boards of publically listed…companies, both
genders should be represented, as follows:
1. Where there are two or three board members,
both genders should be represented.
2. Where there are four or five board members, both
genders should be represented with at least two
members each.
3. Where there are six to eight board members, both
genders should be represented with at least three
members each.
4. Where there are nine or more members of the
board, each gender should be represented with at
least 40 percent each.
5. Rules 1 to 4 also apply to the election of deputy
members.7

Law, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
01/28/world/europe/28iht-quota.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
2 Id.
3 Knut Nygaard, Forced Board Changes: Evidence from Norway 22 (Norwegian Sch. Of Econ., Discussion Paper, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793227.
4 AAGOTH STORVIK & MARI TEIGEN, FREIDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG, WOMEN
BOARD: THE NORWEGIAN EXPERIENCE 7 (2010), available at
ON
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07309.pdf.
5 Id. at 4.
6 Id.
7 Id.
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In 2003, the Norwegian Parliament approved this amendment to Norway’s Companies Act.8 Beginning in 2006, the quota has been applied to all “newly established public limited
companies.”9 Originally, the Norwegian Parliament preferred
the adoption of the quota to be voluntary.10 However, in 2006,
a mandatory quota was instituted because firms failed to raise
their female representation in compliance with the suggestive
quota.11 In 2008, all public limited companies were required to
instate this quota.12
To facilitate this change, the Norwegian government created a database of female candidates for corporations to evaluate
the qualifications of potential women leaders.13 Furthermore,
the penalties for non-compliance work to assist as another
foundational driving force behind the accomplishment of the
quotas: “non-compliance with the sanctions, mean the closing
down of companies who fail to comply.”14 Additionally, company board registration is prohibited if the requirements of representation are not met.15
II. EFFECTS OF SECTION 6-11A
A. Kenneth R. Ahern and Amy K. Dittmar Study
In order to reasonably ascertain the effects of the Norway’s
Companies Act on corporate firms, it is necessary to simply
look at the numbers. First, take Kenneth R. Ahern and Amy
K. Dittmar’s study, which concentrated on the effects of the
quota on board characteristics, profitability, and overall firm
value.16 Their study was composed of a sample size of 1,230
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
10 SUSAN VINNICOMBE ET AL., WOMEN ON CORPORATE BOARDS OF
DIRECTORS: INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 82 (2008).
11 David A. Matsa & Amalia R. Miller, A Female Style in Corporate Leadership? Evidence from Quotas 6 (Inst. for the Stud. of Lab. (IZA), Discussion
Paper, 2012).
12 STORVIK & TEIGEN, supra note 4, at 4.
13 Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards:
The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation,
127 Q. J. ECON. 137, 145 (2011).
14 VINNICOMBE ET AL, supra note 8, at 83.
15 Storvik & Teigen, supra note 4, at 9.
16 See Ahern & Dittmar, supra note 13.
8
9
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firm-year observations, covering 248 Norwegian firms.17
In regards to their financial status, a firm’s value was
computed mainly using Tobin’s Q.18 Q is “the sum of the total
assets and market equity less common book equity divided by
total assets.”19 Financially, the leverage of the firms stayed
constant during the study, but the short-term debt rose over
time.20 Tobin’s Q ranged from 1.11 to 1.88, with a mean of
1.53.21
Board sizes have remained moderately constant over the
years, signifying that corporations replaced individuals on the
board to observe the quota, rather than adding members to
achieve the same result.22 However, there is negative data that
correlates to the quota’s effect on firm policies.23 The theory is
that if the management board lacks experience in comparison
to a board, which is not mandated by a quota, then the firm’s
overall value decreases.24 Firms increased their financial risk
as a result of the quota, due to the increase in debt level and
leverage.25 Efficiency decreased as there were less experienced
board members handling top-level positions.26
Ahern and Dittmar came to several general conclusions as
a result of these statistics:
By the end of the 2000s, the average board has less CEO experience, fewer insiders, and more non-executive managers. The
gender differences in these characteristics and the coincidence of
timing between these changes and the implementation of the
quota suggest that the quota dramatically changed not only the
gender but also other characteristics of the board.27

Overall, the data is consistent with the concept of the quotas putting a restriction on the freedom of corporations to
choose new members based purely on qualifications. This signifies that before, the quota boards were chosen to maximize
Id. at 149.
Id. at 148.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 154.
21 Id. at 154.
22 Id. at 153.
23 Id. at 159-60.
24 Id. at 179.
25 Id. at 180-81.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 154-55.
17
18
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wealth, and after, the constraints due to gender representation
negatively impacted their value.
B. Knut Nygaard Study
Compare the above study with one conducted by Knut Nygaard of the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. Nygaard’s criticisms of Ahern and Dittmar’s
study included a failure to “condition their analysis on firm
specific information asymmetry,” as well as a sample size
which over-emphasized new firms.28 Nygaard’s sample size involved a survey of all Norwegian listed firms, done on behalf of
the Daily Oslo Stock Exchange (OSO) by the auditing firm
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) in 2005.29
The survey measured the value and availability of public
information, rather than a firm’s compliance with the legislation. Additionally, Nygaard specifically addressed Ahern and
Dittmar’s study in his findings. Nygaard takes the position
that their sampling bias, excluding year 2007, creates an emphasis on new firms, which could account for the reduced market value based on Tobin’s Q.30 Furthermore, Ahern and
Dittmar’s study has less than one third of the firms that are included in Nygaard’s statistical analysis.31 Nygaard seriously
questions Ahern and Dittmar’s results due to their sampling
procedures, and argues several competing conclusions.
First, Nygaard asserts that the firms, which had subpar
board construction prior to the quota, benefitted from the increased monitoring from women on the board. Second, a surge
of female board members correlates to an increase in outside
directors. “With less information asymmetry, it is easier for an
outside or female director to transform her general expertise to
a specific firm and become an effective director.”32 Most importantly, Nygaard concluded that a negative impact from the
legislation is generally inconsequential at “standard levels of
statistical significance.”33
28

Nygaard, supra note 3, at 3.
Id. at 10.
30 Id. at 18.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 19.
33 Id.
29
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C. David A. Matsa and Amalia R. Miller Study
David A. Matsa and Amalia R. Miller also conducted a
study regarding the effect of the mandate on corporate profits.34 They compared firms in Norway before and after the
mandate using data from Bureau Van Dyjk’s Orbis database.35
The sample size was limited to firms “with shares listed on an
exchange and with nonmissing information on directors, industry, assets, employees, labor costs, and operating profits in
2006,” totaling 104 companies.36
An index was created from a certain selection of firms in
Norway: “[f]or each public company in Norway, we identify the
five closest firms in each of the three comparison groups based
on industry, assets, employees, and operating profits in 2006.”37
Overall, there were 1,560 observations corresponding to 1,103
different firms.38 As a result, female representation increased
from 1.1 to 2.3, and male members decreased from 5.0 to 4.1.39
In comparison to Ahern and Dittmar’s study, which showed no
change in board size, this study found that board size increased
marginally from 6.1 to 6.3 members.40
Additionally, in contrast41 to Ahern’s study, the quota’s effect on corporate profit was not statistically significant.42
Matsa and Miller concluded that there was a short-term profit
decline.43 More importantly, it shed light on other aspects of
the mandatory representation. For example: employment rose,
there were sizable differences in managerial styles between the
two sexes, and there is evidence that “female corporate leaders
exhibit similar values and preferences outside of Norway as
well.”44
In comparatively assessing these studies, there are definite
transformations of corporate boards in Norway due to the
Matsa & Miller, supra note 10, at 4-5.
Id. at 7.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 8.
38 Id. at 9.
39 Id.at 8.
40 Id. at 9.
41 Id. at 27.
42 Id. at 30.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 34.
34
35
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mandate of female representation. A common hypothesis that
Ahern and Dittmar, as well as Matsa and Miller share, is that
changes in profitability could be a result of the dysfunctional
transition period of the legislation.45 They both found that the
quota had affected corporate policies.46 The Matsa and Miller
study contrastingly found that there was no decline in average
director experience following the quota, making inexperience of
new female members ineffectual on the firm’s overall performance following the legislation.47
III. GENERAL TRENDS AND THEORIES BEHIND FEMALE
REPRESENTATION ON CORPORATE BOARDS
There are many contending theories as to which environmental factors are associated with increased female roles in
corporations, and what affects this diversity has on performance. For example, according to Terjesen and Singh, historical political elements are disassociated with an increase in female directorships.48 These authors present two competing
theories as to why female political representation correlates
negatively with female representation on corporate boards.
First, women make a conscious choice to chase jobs in politics
over business, in those countries where political power has
been developing.49 Second, countries with high representation
of women in politics have become complacent.50
Anne Sweigart gives credence to the first, rather than second, theory. She reasons that the complacency theory is unlikely to be applicable to the Norwegian quota, because countless women’s groups supported the amendment.51 The first
theory is more plausible because women have pursued careers
in politics for the logical reason that prior to the quota, they
saw more room for progression in that field as opposed to the
Id. at 26.
Id. at 33.
47 Id. at 25.
48 Siri Terjesen & Val Singh, Female Presence on Corporate Boards: A
Multi-Country Study of Environmental Context, 83 J. BUS. ETHICS 55, 61
(2008).
49 Id. at 57-58.
50 Id. at 61.
51 Anne Sweigart, Women on Board for Change: The Norway Model of
Boardroom Quotas as a Tool for Progress in the United States and Canada,
32 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 81, 86 (2012).
45
46
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corporate world.52
The economic development of a certain country is not dispositive of a country’s decision to mandate a gender-equality
quota in the workplace. There are examples of nations with
low development levels and increased female representation,
and also countries with higher development levels that have
lower numbers of women in high-level positions.53 Although
economic development has virtually no impact on female representation, research has shown that diversity on corporate
boards has improved decision-making and monitoring functions.54
First, since women and men have different capabilities and
potentials, diversity allows for the demonstration of a wider
range of skills.55 Second, because men and women have different “life experiences,” their inclusion gives corporate boards a
wider range of solutions to business and management issues.56
Finally, the simple awareness of diversity on a board tends to
positively alter team dynamics.57 Additionally, there is evidence that diversity “can enhance a firm’s reputation with consumers.”58
Amidst these competing theories, a few solid correlations
can be determined. First, female representation correlates
negatively with political representation, while the economic
status of a country seems to have no effect on gender-equality.
Second, there is evidence that such diversity does in fact have
an effect on overall workmanship and collaboration. Finally,
some authorities hold that there is a positive effect in incorporating female characteristics into boards.

Id.
Rohini Pande and Deanna Ford, Gender Quotas and Female Leadership: A Review 5 (Harv. Univ., Discussion Paper, Apr. 7, 2011),
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rpande/papers/Gender%20Quotas%20%20April%202011.pdf.
54 See Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity on Corporate
Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make? (Rock Ctr. for Corp.
Governance at Stan. Univ., Working Paper No. 89, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1685615.
55 Id. at 10.
56 Id. at 11.
57 Id. at 13-14.
58 Id.
52

53
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IV. EVALUATION OF AVENUES TO FULLY ACHIEVE DIVERSITY IN
THE WORKPLACE
The Norwegian quota is certainly groundbreaking legislation, working to achieve diversity on a massive scale. However,
there are many critics of this avenue for achieving gender balance, while also enhancing corporate performance. Many feel
that instituting a quota produces a less-qualified managerial
board.59 As a result, foreign investors might opt out of companies they feel would be less profitable as a result of inexperienced leaders.60
However, Reiersen and Sjafjell dismiss this argument as
meritless61 “Meeting the requirements of Section 6-11a should
[therefore] not be difficult, although investors that are used to
looking to ‘boys’ clubs’ only for directors will have to take off
their blinkers.”62 Furthermore, the Act does not entirely restrict a corporation’s freedom in selecting directors.
Despite criticisms in regards to a less-qualified managerial
board, many preventative measures can be taken if a country
decides to implement such a quota. For example, corporations
can institute programs to ensure that female employees possess comparable skills to male directors. A successful quota requires a cooperative environment, and since men have had this
experience from already fulfilling such positions, they would
only benefit from conducting workshops and seminars to share
their knowledge with their upcoming female peers.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the statistical data present here is not indicative of a mandate applied in other
countries. A rising number of governments are instituting a
similar quota, which will eliminate the inherent shock that
Norway experienced with this cutting-edge legislation.63 Arni
Hole, the director general of the Equality Ministry stated that
when the quota was first announced: “There were, literally,

STORVIK & TEIGEN, supra note 4, at 6.
Id. at 7.
61 Beate Sjafjell & Hedvig Bugge Reiersen, Report from Norway: Gender
Equality in the Board Room 7 (European Co. Law, Working Paper No. 8,
2008).
62 Id.
59
60

	
  
63

See Clark, supra note 1.
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screams…it was a real shock treatment.”64
Spain and the Netherlands have announced legislation
similar to Norway.65 Other countries such as France, Belgium,
Germany, and Sweden are also considering a mandate.66 These
countries can not only learn from Norway’s example, but also
improve their own processes of instituting such altering legislation. “Any negative effect that Section 6-11a may have should
be confined to these early days before investors are acquainted
with the rule.”67 This logic with foreign investors applies to the
entirety of the corporations who choose to learn from Norway’s
example. The adjustment period should grow shorter as more
countries follow the Norwegian example.
Another way to achieve diversity on corporate boards
would be to compel companies to release information on retention, recruitment, and the promotion of women, in order to create transparency of large companies.68 Forcible disclosure
would provide an incentive for corporations to be more conscious of the inclusion of women, and prevent possible discrimination in the workplace. The government could also get involved in this endeavor by mandating that companies “disclose
whether women and minority candidates were considered or
interviewed for open positions.”69
The Norwegian government’s example in the Act shows
how influential legislation can be in regulating gender balance.
Despite what avenue they decide to take, corporations can expand their horizons and come up with different search techniques for gaining qualified candidates. For example, corporations can utilize professional consultants to search for eligible
individuals to fill the firm’s needs. Furthermore, companies do
not have to limit themselves to CEOs, but can consider other
positions, such as corporate executives, academic experts, and
nonprofit executives.70 With a changing dynamic on corporate
boards, firms need to adjust and develop different processes for
finding and hiring capable and skilled workers.
64

Id.

65Rhode

& Packel, supra note 54, at 21.
Id.
67 Reiersen & Sjafjell, supra note 62, at 7.
68 Rhode & Packel, supra note 54, at 20.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 22.
66
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V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the example Norway set with Section 6-11a is groundbreaking, shocking, and will set a precedent for female representation on corporate boards and in the
workplace in general. European Union Justice Commissioner,
Viviane Reding, stated at the beginning of this proposition:
“Today we are proposing a legislation to smash the glass ceiling
that keeps talented women out of top jobs.”71 However, this
change involved a dramatic procedural difference that included
specifically singling out women and throwing them into the
corporate abyss. “Ironically, achieving gender balance relies on
labeling gender.”72
The different studies on the statistic consequences of Section 6-11a yield different results due to sampling size and procedural methods. There is not much merit to the proposition
that Norwegian corporations are suffering economically due to
the mandate. The statistical studies, when taken together, do
not necessarily speak to the quota’s negativity in regards to its
effect on the corporations. It is my position that nations can only learn from Norway’s implementation process; and there are
many different initiatives available to strengthen the female
candidate pool to ensure prosperity. Furthermore, quotas are
not the end of the possibilities for securing female representation in corporations, and more generally, in the workplace.
With innovation, like Norway’s law, on the rise, there is no limitation to the goals that could be accomplished regarding gender-equality.

71 Reding Pushes 40% Female Quota on Corporate Boards, EURACTIV
(Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.euractiv.com/socialeurope/commission-givesgreen-light-gen-news-516048.
72 Darren Rosenblum, Loving Gender Balance: Reframing Identity-Based
Equality Remedies, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2873, 2886 (2008).
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